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THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT DYSFUNCTION:
PROBLEMS OF THE WTO MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM
ERIK M. DICKINSON†
ABSTRACT:
This Note argues that WTO member nations should use bilateral and regional
trade agreements to solve key issues facing the Doha Round negotiations in order to
lower trade barriers and foster a climate of free trade necessary to resurrect the
stalled Doha Round. Several problems including the WTO’s lack of authority to
enforce DSU decisions, protectionist trade measures, and the single undertaking
have threatened the long term stability of the WTO’s multilateral trading system.
However, if bilateral and regional trade agreements were used to solve key issues,
much like they were used by the United States in the 1970s, WTO member nations
would have a legitimate opportunity to end the Doha Round stalemate once and for
all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA), more commonly referred to as the Doha
Round, was established in November of 2001 at the fourth World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar. 1 The negotiations
are often referred to as the Doha Round because the original “round” of negotiations
took place in Doha, Qatar.2 The objective of the Doha Round is to facilitate an
atmosphere of trade liberalization and encourage development by lowering trade
barriers around the world. 3 Specifically, as a development round, Doha seeks to
“reduce or eliminate agricultural trade barriers”4 in an effort to open trade and
prosperity toward poor countries.5 These goals came “in response to the urgency of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the UN Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).”6 Unfortunately, after a decade of negotiations, the Doha Round has
stalled and is now “the longest trade round in GATT/WTO history.”7
As a multilateral trade agreement, an agreement between many nations at one
time,8 a benefit of the Doha Round negotiations is that all nations are treated
equally.9 However, multilateral trade agreements are very complicated to negotiate 10
and with 149 member nations of the WTO participating in the Doha Round 11 it is
easy to see how disagreements between nations are inevitable. Further complicating
the possibility of member nations reaching an agreement is the single undertaking
that stipulates that “virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and
indivisible package and cannot be agreed to separately.” 12 Essentially, “nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed.” Therefore, in order to resurrect the stalled Doha
Round, this Note recommends that WTO member nations, led by the United States,
follow a two-step approach. First, remove the most pressing issues from the
impractical single undertaking. Second, focus on solving these issues by reaching
bilateral and regional agreements. By following this approach, WTO member
nations will create the building blocks necessary to move towards successfully
completing the Doha Round.
1

Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 573, 577 (2010).
2

See id. (discussing the history of the Doha Round).

3

Id. at 574-75; see also Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details,
Grand Themes, and China too, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (2009).
4

Cho, supra note 1, at 577.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 574-75.

7

Id. at 574.

8

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).

9

See
Kimberly
Amadeo,
Multilateral
Trade
Agreements,
ABOUT.COM,
http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/multilateral.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

How the Negotiations are Organized, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
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Section II of this Note will provide a brief history of several key trade
agreements leading up to the creation of the WTO and the Doha Round. Section III
will discuss the benefits of the WTO trading system. Section IV highlights key areas
where the WTO has failed to effectively facilitate an environment of free trade. One
concern is the WTO’s lack of authority to enforce panel or Appellate Body
decisions13 under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Another concern is
the crippling effect the single undertaking has on the negotiations of several highly
technical and heavily debated issues. Finally, Section V of this Note concludes that
using bilateral14 and regional15 agreements to solve key issues will lower trade
barriers and foster a climate of free trade necessary to resurrect the Doha Round.
This Note will consider several previously published scholarly opinions on the
subject of trade liberalization, but will ultimately conclude that bilateral and regional
trade agreements provide a workable approach to resolve the key issues that have
stalled the Doha Round.
II. BACKGROUND
At the end of World War II, in an effort to move away from the protectionist
measures of the 1930s, 15 countries began talks to reduce and bind customs tariffs in
an effort that would eventually produce the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).16 Meanwhile, a group of 50 countries, including the initial 15, were
negotiating to create an International Trade Organization (ITO) which would
“extend beyond world trade disciplines, to include rules on employment, commodity
agreements, restrictive business practices, international investment, and services.” 17
As negotiations on an ITO were ongoing, the GATT negotiators, now expanded to
23 countries, had reached an agreement that resulted in “a package of trade rules and
45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion of trade, about one fifth of the world’s
total.”18 The GATT was signed on October 30, 1947 and came into effect on

13
Casey Reeder, Zeroing in on Charming Betsy: How an Antidumping Controversy
Threatens to Sink the Schooner, 36 STETSON L. REV. 255, 265 (2006).
14

Bilateral trade agreements are between two nations at a time. They are relatively easy to
negotiate and provide the participating nations with favored trading status between each other.
See
Kimberly
Amadeo
Bilateral
Trade
Agreement,
ABOUT.COM,
http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/bilateral.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
15

Regional trade agreements are between many nations from a specified area or region.
Specifically, regional trade agreements facilitate free trade within a region by lifting trade
barriers
like
export
tariffs.
See
Regional
Trade
Agreement,
EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/facts_6850611_definition-regional-trade-agreements.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2013).
16
See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011)
[hereinafter GATT].
17

Id.

18

Id.
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January 1, 1948.19 A short time later, in March of 1948, the ITO charter was agreed
to.20
A. GATT 1947
The original plan was for GATT to operate only provisionally until the ITO
could establish more comprehensive institutional agreements. 21 However, in 1950,
when the United States government decided not to ratify the ITO charter, the ITO
was “effectively dead.”22 As a result, “the GATT became the only multilateral
instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the WTO was established
in 1995.”23
B. Tokyo Round & Trade Act of 1974
In order to continue GATT’s objective of reducing tariffs, 102 countries took part
in the Tokyo Round which began in 1973.24 In addition, some agreements involving
non-tariff barriers came out of the negotiations. 25 The United States was authorized
to participate in the Tokyo Round through The United States’ Trade Act of 1974
(Trade Act of 1974).26 The Trade Act of 1974 also created procedures for approving
resulting agreements.27 Specifically, the Trade Act of 1974 “allowed Congress to
work closely with the executive branch during the multilateral negotiations” 28 and
“required a prompt congressional vote on each MTN [Multilateral Trade
Negotiation] agreement without amendments—a key concession vital to Tokyo
Round participation by U.S. trading partners, who had been frustrated by past
congressional undermining of provisions agreed upon in negotiations.” 29
1. Fast Track Approval Process
Under section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, the President was given trade
agreement authority that “delegated power to the President to negotiate and enter
into trade agreements on non-tariff barriers provided that Congress retained the final

19

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 5
U.N.T.S. 194.
20

GATT, supra note 16.

21

Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and
the European Union, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 556, 562-63 (1996-97).
22

GATT, supra note 16.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Peter D. Staple, Implementing “Tokyo Round” Commitments: The New Injury Standard
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1980).
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.
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authority to approve the implementing legislation for these trade agreements.” 30 In
addition, section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 prevented Congress from amending
provisions (of an agreement) separately and forced Congress to either approve or
disapprove of the entire agreement as finalized by the participating countries. 31
Moreover, Congress only had 90 days to vote on the trade agreement. 32 This
“expedited approval process” is sometimes referred to as the “fast-track approval
process.”33 This “fast-track” process meant that foreign governments could reach
agreements with the U.S. without worrying that the U.S. Congress could alter certain
aspects of the agreement.34 Thus, the Trade Act of 1974 helped create greater
liberalization of trade by giving foreign governments more confidence to negotiate
and reach agreements with the U.S, as evidenced by the several trade agreements
reached under “fast-track” authority.35
2. Trade Agreements Act of 1979
The Tokyo Round was enacted by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.36 Also, in
an effort to revise U.S. laws according to the Tokyo Round GATT agreements, the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 reenacted the 1921 Antidumping Act as Title VII of
the Tariff Act of 1930.37 In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 expressly provides that “if there were any conflict between
any trade agreement and any statute of the United States, then U.S. law would
prevail.”38 “An accompanying Senate report stated that “Congress adopted [these]
procedures [Trade Act of 1974 and Trade Agreements Act of 1979] as a means to
avoid conflict between the Congress and the President such as the dispute which
occurred after the Kennedy Round.” 39
C. Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round was launched in September 1986 with a negotiating agenda
that covered several trade issues including new areas such as trade in services and

30

The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, U.S.Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy, No. TA-2111-1, USITC
Pub. 3621 (Aug. 1, 2003) at 15 [hereinafter USITC].
31

Id.

32
See Fast Track—Presidential Trade Negotiating Authority, PUBLIC CITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/trade/fasttrack/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Fast Track].
33

USITC, supra note 30, at 15.

34

Fast Track, supra note 32.

35

USITC, supra note 30, at 15.

36

Id. at 16-17.

37
Mary Jane Alves, Reflections on the Current State of Play: Have U.S. Courts Finally
Decided to Stop Using International Agreements and Reports of International Trade Panels in
Adjudicating International Trade Cases?, 17 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 299, 306 (2009).
38

Id.

39

Id.
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intellectual property as well as attempts to reform trade in agriculture and textiles. 40
In addition, every original GATT article was up for review, which made the Uruguay
Round the single largest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed to. 41 In December
1988, early agreements included a more efficient dispute settlement system, a trade
policy review mechanism focused on reviewing “national trade policies and
practices of GATT members,”42 and, in an effort to assist developing countries,
concessions were made on market access for tropical products. 43 In December 1991,
the first draft of the “final act” was completed and became the basis for the final
agreement.44
However, over the next two years disagreements arose over issues including
“agriculture...services, market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation
of a new institution.”45 In November 1992, the U.S. and EU came to an agreement
on agriculture in what is now referred to the “Blair House accord.”46 In July 1993,
the four major trading partners (U.S., EU, Canada and Japan) came to an agreement
on market access in an effort to complete the Uruguay Round. 47 The Uruguay
Round was successfully completed on April 15, 1994 when ministers from most of
the 123 participating governments signed the Marrakesh Declaration. 48
1. WTO & GATT 1994
Possibly the most important result of the Uruguay Round was the creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) which came into existence on January 1, 1995.49
The new GATT (GATT 1994) was also created under the Uruguay Round and came
into effect on January 1, 1995.50 “The WTO replaced GATT as an international
organization, but the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty
for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations.” 51 “Trade
lawyers distinguish between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT
1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994.”52
40

See The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Uruguay
Round].
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

USITC, supra note 30, at 34.

47

Id.

48

Uruguay Round, supra note 40.

49

Robin Miller, J.D., Annotation, Effect of World Trade Organization (WTO) Decisions
Upon United States, 17 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2007).
50
Marie Louise Hurabiell, Protectionism versus Free Trade: Implementing the GATT
Antidumping Agreement in the United States, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 567, 577 (1995).
51

Uruguay Round, supra note 40.

52

Id.
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After completing the largest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed to, many
did not believe that another negotiation of the same magnitude would ever be
possible.53 “Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new
negotiations on a number of topics. And by 1996, some countries were openly
calling for a new round early in the next century.” 54 While the response was mixed,
“the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to reopen negotiations
on agriculture and services at the turn of the century. These began in early 2000 and
were incorporated into the Doha Development Agenda in late 2001.”55
D. Doha Round
The initial outlook on greater market access for developing countries was
positive in 2001 when the Doha Round began. However, in 2009, due to the
collapse of negotiations on agriculture and industrial tariffs between developed and
developing countries56 in 2003,57 and the start of a global recession in 2008, the
volume of global trade fell for the first time since World War II. 58 Due to the current
fragile state of the global economy, a failure by the WTO member nations to
resurrect the stalled Doha Round “would further discredit the WTO system and
supply ample ammunition to politicians leaning toward protectionism.” 59 According
to Marcus Wallenberg, “the lack of political will on the part of WTO members to
resolve differences on agricultural subsidies and market access has put the entire
round and the multilateral trading system in peril.” 60 Therefore, in order to avoid an
era of global protectionism, member nations participating in the Doha Round
negotiations need to narrow their focus to reaching regional and bilateral trade
agreements that address the issues at the heart of the stalled Doha Round. These
agreements would have the desired effect of lowering trade barriers and creating
greater market access for developing countries.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Lamy Cites Talks’ ‘Paralysis’ as Members Admit Latest
Doha Failure, WTO REP. (July 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X1JJILR36Q80.
57

Id.

58

Cho, supra note 1, at 589; see also Open Markets Would Support Rebound in Trade in
2010,
INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY
FUND
(Jan.
13,
2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/SurveyartB.htm (indicating that trade
volume fell by 18 percent).
59
60

Cho, supra note 1, at 589.

In
quotes:
The
Doha
deadlock,
BBC NEWS
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5216080.stm (statements of
International Chamber of Commerce).

(July
26,
2006),
Marcus Wallenberg,
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III. BENEFITS OF THE WTO MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
The WTO provides a forum for its 153 member nations 61 to negotiate trade
agreements and settle trade disputes.62 In order to achieve the main objective which
is to help “ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible,”63
the WTO attempts to ensure that “individuals, companies and governments know
what the trade rules are around the world.” 64 In doing so, the WTO believes that
these entities will have the confidence necessary to actively participate in trade
agreements that will facilitate “economic development and well-being.”65
According to the WTO, there are 10 benefits of the multilateral trading system. 66
First, the system promotes peace among the member nations. 67 The WTO believes
that it has contributed to world peace by “helping trade to flow smoothly, and
providing countries with a constructive and fair outlet for dealing with disputes over
trade issues.”68 It is commonplace throughout history for trade disputes to cause
war.69 Most notably, a trade war came about in the 1930s when “countries competed
to raise trade barriers in order to protect domestic producers and retaliate against
each other’s barriers. This worsened the Great Depression and eventually played a
part in the outbreak of World War [II].”70 In response, the GATT and the WTO
were created as trading systems that would promote free trade and prevent
protectionist measures that had led to war in the past. 71
The second benefit of the WTO trading system is the dispute settlement
understanding (DSU) which provides WTO member nations with a forum to handle
disputes constructively.72 When conflicts arise between member nations, the DSU
allows for specially appointed independent experts to determine whether the accused
party successfully followed the rules as set forth in the applicable WTO agreement. 73
61

See Who we are, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

See 10 benefits of the WTO trading system, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b00_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
67

See 1. The system helps to keep the peace, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
68

Id.

69

Id

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

See 2. The system allows disputes to be handled constructively, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b02_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011).
73

Who we are, supra note 61.
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Third, the rules of the WTO multilateral trading system make life easier for member
nations.74 With the WTO, “a single set of rules applying to all members greatly
simplifies the entire trade regime.” 75 In addition, smaller countries have increased
bargaining power under multilateral agreements because all parties to the agreement
have equal rights.76 Therefore, when more powerful developed countries fail to
follow the rules, smaller developing countries now have the ability to challenge the
developed countries under the DSU. 77
The fourth benefit of the WTO multilateral trading system is that free trade
lowers the cost of living.78 The bottom line is that while “protectionism is
expensive,”79free trade benefits consumers and “we are all consumers.” 80 With 153
member nations taking part in the WTO system, which promotes free trade, trade
barriers have been lowered.81
The result has been “reduced costs of
production...reduced prices of finished goods and services, and ultimately a lower
cost of living.”82 Fifth, the WTO trading system provides a greater variety of
products and qualities to choose from. 83 Lower trade barriers provide greater market
access to countries that export goods and services.84 Once they arrive in the U.S.,
these imports give consumers more options. In addition, “[e]ven the quality of
locally-produced goods can improve because of the competition from imports.” 85
Sixth, the WTO trading system increases trade which leads to increased
incomes.86 “The WTO’s own estimates for the impact of the 1994 Uruguay Round
74

See 3. A system based on rules rather than power makes life easier for all, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b03_ e.htm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
75

Id.

76

See
Kimberly
Amadeo,
Multilateral
Trade
Agreements,
ABOUT.COM,
http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/multilateral.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).
77

Id.

78
See 4. Freer trade cuts the cost of living, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b04_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

See 5. It gives consumers more choice, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b05_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
84

See
What
we
stand
for,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
85
86

It gives consumers more choice, supra note 83.

See
6.
Trade
raises
incomes,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b06_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
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trade deal were between $109 billion and $510 billion added to world income
(depending on the assumptions of the calculations and allowing for margins of
error).”87 Seventh, the WTO trading system creates free trade which in turn creates
jobs by stimulating economic growth. 88 According to the WTO, “trade boosts
economic growth, and that economic growth means more jobs.” 89 The eighth benefit
of the WTO multilateral trading system is efficiency.90 Through policies of nondiscrimination, transparency, increased certainty and trade facilitation, the WTO
system increases efficiency and cuts costs. 91
The ninth benefit is that the WTO system shields governments from the narrow
interests of lobbyists.92 Lobbyists put pressure on the government to protect their
respective industries from imports that are more competitively priced. 93 The
resulting protection is often achieved by raising tariffs, 94 or providing government
subsidies to the domestic industry. 95 However, this behavior “biases the economy
against other sectors which shouldn’t be penalized,” for example, “if you protect
your clothing industry, everyone else has to pay for more expensive clothes, which
puts pressure on wages in all sectors.”96 Lastly, the WTO trading system encourages
governments to follow better policies while discouraging unwise practices such as
corruption.97 “For businesses, [this] means greater certainty and clarity about trading
conditions. For governments it can often mean good discipline.” 98

87

Id.

88
See 7. Trade stimulates economic growth, and that can be good news for employment
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/
10b07_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
89

Id.

90

See 8. The basic principles make the system economically more efficient, and they cut
costs, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
10ben_e/10b08_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
91

Id.

92

See 9. The system shields governments from narrow interests, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b09_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011).
93

Id.

94

See
Tariffs,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariffs_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).

http://www.wto.org/

95

See Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2011).
96

The system shields governments from narrow interests, supra note 92.

97

See 10. The system encourages good government, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b10_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
98

Id.
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Although there are many benefits of the WTO multilateral trading system, this
Note will examine certain aspects of the system that appear to hinder the WTO’s
ability to ensure that “trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.” 99
IV. PROBLEMS OF THE WTO MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
While the WTO as a whole provides many benefits to its member nations, the
multilateral trading system often creates several problems that make reaching trade
agreements very difficult.100 As evidenced by the stalled Doha Round, two of the
most pressing problems are the WTO’s lack of authority to enforce DSU decisions
and the crippling effect of the single undertaking.
A. WTO’s Lack of Authority to Enforce DSU Decisions
As one author points out, “perhaps the biggest challenge presented by…dispute
settlement structures is the utter lack of enforcement power.” 101 The DSU oversees
the dispute resolution process for the WTO member nations. 102 First, a threemember panel103 of specially appointed independent experts is assembled.104 When
hearing a case the panel must make “an objective assessment of the facts of the case
and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.” 105
Next, after the panel has released their report, the adverse party may appeal to the
Appellate Body.106 The Appellate Body is made up of seven members but only three
members hear a particular case.107 The DSU panels do not interpret or apply the
domestic law of any member nation.108 Instead, DSU panels determine whether a
particular agency of a certain WTO member nation acted in a manner that is
inconsistent with the applicable trade agreements.109 Essentially, the DSU panels
and Appellate Body decisions are a “non-binding interpretation of an international
agreement.”110 As a result, it is not uncommon for “major powers…[to]
99

Who we are, supra note 61.

100

Multilateral Trade Agreements, supra note 76.

101

Reeder, supra note 13, at 286.

102

Id. at 264.

103

Id. at 265.

104

See What we do, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm (last visited May 13, 2013).
105

See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
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ignore…dispute settlement decisions which do not comport with their economic
interests.”111
1. URAA Supremacy Clause
In 1994, when the WTO was formed out of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
Congress was reluctant to cede any authority to the WTO in its new capacity as an
international law making body. 112 In order to “ensure the primacy of United States
law,”113 the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) “included as its first provision
a section best described as the URAA Supremacy Clause.”114 While this author
understands that DSU decisions are not binding on other countries for reasons other
than those explored here, this section focuses on the United States as one example of
how a WTO member nation may ensure that DSU decisions are nothing more than
non-binding interpretations of an international agreement.115
2. Corus Staal BV v. United States Department of Commerce
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Corus
Staal BV v. United States Department of Commerce116 (Corus Staal II) recognized
the effect of the URAA Supremacy Clause. 117 Specifically, in Corus Staal II, the
court determined that WTO decisions are “not binding on the United states, much
less this Court.”118 Moreover, “no provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements…, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have
effect.”119
from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Bed Linen]; see also Corus Staal BV
v. U.S. Dept. of Com., 27 C.I.T. 388 (2003), modified, 27 C.I.T. 1180 (2003), 27 C.I.T. 1469
(2003), and 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
111

Michael Patrick Tkacik, Post-Uruguay Round GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement:
Substance, Strengths, Weaknesses, and Causes for Concern, 9 INT’L. LEGAL PERSP. 169, 169
(1997).
112

Senator Robert Dole, advocating in Congressional hearings for the passage of the
URAA stated: “Our sovereignty is not threatened by the WTO. The WTO has no power to
force the United States to do anything. They cannot make us do anything. It is not a
world power. If the WTO finds that U.S. law does not square with the obligations we have
assumed under the agreement, we remain totally free to disregard that finding. It does not
change U.S. law.” Kevin P. Cummins, Trade Secrets: How the Charming Betsy Canon may do
more to Weaken U.S. Environmental Laws than the WTO's Trade Rules, 12 Fordham Envtl.
L.J. 141 (2000) [hereinafter Trade Secrets].
113

See Davenport, supra note 110, at 288.
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Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2000)). Section 3512 is the third provision in the URAA,
following § 3501 (“Definitions” and § 3511 (“Approval and entry into force of Uruguay
Round Agreements”). 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3511.
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See Reeder, supra note 13, at 282-83.
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See Corus Staal II, 395 F.3d at 1347-49.
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See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1).
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See Corus Staal II, 395 F.3d at 1348 (internal citation omitted).
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As a result, when WTO agreements or DSU decisions are inconsistent with
United States law, it is the responsibility of Congress, not the courts to either ignore
the DSU decisions as inconsistent with the interests of the United States or honor our
trade agreements by incorporating the DSU decisions into the applicable statutes. 120
However, with constant turnover of members and party majorities in Congress,
incorporating DSU decisions into United States law may be a difficult feat to
accomplish. As Senator Robert Dole stated, “If the WTO finds that U.S. law does
not square with the obligations we have assumed under the agreement, we remain
totally free to disregard that finding. It does not change U.S. law.” 121 Moreover,
external pressure from lobbyists and special interest groups, that may oppose
opening their markets to foreign competition, may make deferring to international
pressures even less appealing.
B. Problems with Protectionist Measures
While the “URAA Supremacy Clause” provides Congress with the ability to
“veto” any unintended implications of an agreement, many negative consequences of
the clause remain. One such consequence is the inability of the DSU to effectively
curtail protectionist measures like anti-dumping laws, agricultural subsidies and
zeroing.
1. Anti-dumping laws
The source of domestic anti-dumping laws in the United States is the Tariff Act
of 1930.122 Ultimately, dumping is “the sale or likely sale of goods at less than fair
value.”123 The United States Department of Commerce (DOC) calculates a dumping
margin in order to determine whether a product is being dumped on the U.S.
market.124 The dumping margin is “the difference between the prices for the
merchandise in the exporter's home market and the importing country.” 125
Therefore, under U.S. law, “dumping occurs when a product is sold in the U.S. for
less than it is sold for in its home market, or if it has no home market, for less than
it’s otherwise determined ‘normal value.”’126
One argument for using anti-dumping laws is that they are necessary to prevent
predatory dumping. For example, by selling a product at a very low price in a
market, a foreign producer can drive out its domestic competition and then raise its
originally low price to a much higher price with impunity. 127 Under U.S. law, the
government may take action against dumping if: “(1) it causes or threatens to cause
120

See id. at 1348-49.

121

See Trade Secrets, supra note 112, at 141.

122

19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1683g (2000).

123

19 U.S.C. § 1677(34).

124

Reeder, supra note 13, at 256.

125
Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 10
(1995).
126
127

Reeder, supra note 13, at 256-57.

See Frances Chang, Arguing Both Sides: Positional Conflicts of Interest in Antidumping
Proceedings, 19 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 583, 584-85 (2006).
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material injury to an established industry in the importing country; or (2) it
materially retards the establishment of an industry in that country.” 128 As a result,
the country harmed by the dumping “may react to dumping by imposing an
antidumping duty on the dumped merchandise in the amount of the dumping
margin.”129
Although anti-dumping laws may seem necessary to facilitate an environment of
fair trade, in application, anti-dumping laws can rarely distinguish between predatory
and other forms of dumping, leading some commentators to argue that anti-dumping
laws are “economically inefficient.”130
2. Agricultural subsidies
In 2008, the Doha Round seemed to be heading toward successful compromise
on several key issues when talks led by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy created
a proposal focusing on the most recent draft modalities on agriculture and nonagricultural market access (NAMA). 131 Yet, in 2009, a major stumbling block
occurred when perceptions arose that the U.S. was unwilling to commit to the
December 2008 agricultural and (NAMA) draft texts.132 As a result, the goal to
lower trade barriers around the world has been stalled due to differences between the
developed world (U.S., EU and Japan) and emerging economies such as India, Brazil
and China.133 The main disagreement is on the extent of liberalization of trade in
industrial goods, agriculture, and services. 134 Specifically, developing countries
want future negotiations to proceed from the agriculture and NAMA texts of 2008.135
However, U.S. industry strongly opposes proceeding from those texts.136
Nowhere is the tension between the critics and the proponents of the
existing multilateral trading system more evident than in matters of
agricultural policy. Indeed, agriculture was one of the most contentious
issues in the recent WTO Ministerial meeting in Qatar and has been one
of the most controversial issues in the multilateral trade negotiations for
the past fifty years. The controversy stems from the fact that the rules
governing agricultural trade, as embodied in the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, are perceived as allowing the United States and the European
128

Bhala, supra note 125, at 9-10.

129

Id. at 10.

130

See Alice Vacek-Aranda, Sugar Wars: Dispute Settlement under NAFTA and the WTO
as Seen through the Lens of the HFCS Case, and its effects on U.S.-Mexican Relations, 12
TEX. HISPANIC J.L. & POL’Y 121, 128 (2006).
131

Cho, supra note 1, at 581.

132

Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 44 INT'L LAW. 93, 94 (2010).

133

Amrit Dhillon, WTO Chief Lamy Visits India in Bid to Jump-Start Stalled Doha Round,
INT’L TRADE REP. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
XAN3MFG5GVG0.
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Union to continue to subsidize agricultural production and to dump
surpluses on world markets at artificially depressed prices while requiring
developing countries to open up their markets to ruinous and unfair
competition from industrialized country producers. 137
While the central theme of the Doha Round is to use free trade in an effort to
promote economic development and alleviate poverty, 138 several problems stemming
from the WTO agreement on agriculture (WAA), 139 which came about during the
Uruguay Round negotiations,140 have led to the Doha Round’s most difficult impasse
to date. Many problems came directly out of the WAA’s negotiation process.
Specifically, the negotiation process was greatly influenced by the intense rivalry
between the United States and the European Union for world agricultural markets.141
As a result of this rivalry, several developing countries were essentially left out of
the negotiating process.142 In addition, while the WAA was intended to create
greater market access for developing countries, the developed countries
commandeered the negotiations in an effort to further stack the deck in their favor.
Therefore, while the WAA on its face appears to create greater market access for
developing countries, the WAA allows developed countries to use several loopholes
in order to maintain the status quo.
There are three major provisions of the WAA that “obligate” WTO members to
liberalize agricultural trade.143 First, the WAA attempts to achieve greater market
access by requiring that all non-tariff barriers be converted into tariffs and then
requiring the binding and reduction of those tariffs. 144 Second, the WAA requires
that both the volume of subsidized exports and the expenditures on subsidized

137

Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 437-38 (2002)
[hereinafter Gonzalez].
138

Id. at 435.

139

While the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture being discussed in this
note have already run their course and additional legislation has
been passed by the
United States congress, these provisions remain important because they have created many of
the problems currently plaguing the Doha Round.
140

Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 449.

141

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A Threat to the GATT and Global
Free Trade, in GATT AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 72 (Masayosi Homna et
al. eds., 1993).
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Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 449.
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Id. at 452.
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See Dale E. McNiel, Furthering the Reforms of Agricultural Policies in the Millennium
Round, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 41, 61 (2000); see also Kevin J. Brosch, The Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture in the GATT, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT 875-76 (H. Applebaum & L. Schlitt eds., 1995). The tariff reduction
and other market access obligations are spelled out in individual country schedules rather than
in the body of the Agreement. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410
(available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf).
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exports be reduced.145 Third, the WAA “requires the reduction of trade-distorting
domestic subsidies.”146 However, as previously mentioned, due to the negotiations of
the WAA being a one sided affair, greatly favoring developed countries maintaining
the status-quo, many of these provisions have failed to create economic development
and alleviate poverty in developing and least developed countries. 147
Under the first WAA provision, over a period of several years, the tariffs must be
bound and reduced to below 1986-88 base levels.148 The exact amount of tariff
reduction for each member to the agreement is specified in each country’s individual
tariff schedule.149 However, developed countries must reduce bound tariffs by an
average of 36 percent over 6 years (1995-2000), at a minimum rate of 15 percent for
each product line.150 In addition, developing countries only need to reduce bound
tariffs by an average of 24 percent over 10 years (1995-2004), at a minimum rate of
10 percent for each product line. 151 Moreover, while least developed countries are
also subject to converting non-tariffs into tariffs and then binding those tariffs,
“[l]east developed countries...are not subject to tariff reduction.” 152 Lastly, the WAA
does not allow WTO members to maintain or revert back to the non-tariff barriers
that were required to be converted into tariffs.153
While the aforementioned market access provision of the WAA appears to level
the playing field for developing countries, developed countries, at the insistence of
the European Union, were able to insert a safeguard provision into the agreement. 154
This special safeguard provision allows for the imposition of an additional duty on a
product. However, that additional duty is subject to conversion from a non-tariff
into a tariff if there is an import surge or in the event of particularly low prices, as
compared with 1986-88 levels.155 An example is, “if the world market price for a
particular commodity drops by more than 10 percent below the 1986-88 reference
price (the trigger price), an additional duty may be applied to maintain price
145

Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 452-53.

146

Id. at 453.

147

Id. at 459-60.

148

See Ian Sturgess, The Liberalisation Process in International Agricultural Trade:
Market Access and Export Subsidies, in NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES: AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE MILLENNIUM WTO ROUND 135, 144-47 (Sanoussi
Bilal & Pavlos Pezaros eds., 2000).
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See Jeffrey J. Steinle, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for
Agriculture, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 346 (1995).
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144, at art. 15:2.
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Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 454; see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144,
at art. 15:2.
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See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144, at art. 4.
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Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 454; see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144,
at art. 5.
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stability.”156 Therefore, because the additional duty rises as the world market price
for that commodity drops, this provision is similar to the variable levy system used
by the European Union because it protects domestic markets from cheaper foreign
imports.157
Another practice used by developed countries to evade the underlying purpose of
the WAA’s requirements is referred to as “dirty tariffication.” 158 Dirty tariffication
is often used by “setting of tariff equivalents for non-tariff barriers at an excessively
high level.”159 Moreover, “[d]irty tariffication nullified the benefits of tariff bindings
and tariff reduction by creating tariff equivalents, to which subsequent reductions
apply, that were at times more import-restrictive than the non-tariff barriers they
replaced.”160 Worse still, in the situations where dirty tariffication resulted in greater
levels of protectionist behavior than the old system allowed, the highest tariffs were
for exactly the types of products that are of particular interest to developing
countries.161 Thus, the safeguard provision and the use of “dirty tariffication” allow
many developed countries to continue using the very same protectionist practices
that the WAA intended to prevent.
Under the second WAA provision, both the volume of subsidized exports and the
expenditures on subsidized exports must be reduced. 162 Specifically, developed
countries are required to lower their expenditures for export subsidies by 36 percent
and lower their volume of subsidized exports by 21 percent over 6 years (1995-2000)
based on the 1986-88 base period.163 In addition, developing countries are required to
cut spending on export subsidies by 24 percent and lower their amount of subsidized
exports by 14 percent over 10 years (1995-2004).164 Moreover, while least developed
countries are not allowed to increase subsidized exports, least developed countries
do not have to reduce export subsidies.165 Lastly, a key distinction between the first
and second WAA provisions is that the second WAA provision applies on a
156

Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 454; see also Sturgess, supra note 148, at 147.
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Id. at 461; see also United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, The PostUruguay Round Tariff Environment For Developing Country Exports: Tariff Peaks and Tariff
Escalation, UN. Doc. TD/B/COM.1/14/Rev. 1, 4-6 (Jan. 29, 2000) (explaining that developed
countries maintained tariff peaks as high as 350-900 percent ad valorem on certain developing
country food exports).
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Id. at 455; see also Sturgess, supra note 148, at 148; Agreement on Agriculture, supra
note 144, at art. 15:2. The Agreement also exempts developing countries from the obligation
to reduce marketing subsidies, such as international and internal transport and freight charges,
provided that these are not used to circumvent subsidy reduction obligations. Agreement on
Agriculture, supra note 144, at art. 9:4.
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commodity-by-commodity basis, unlike the first WAA provision which applied on
the basis of an industry average.166
Once again, much like the first WAA provision, there is a loophole under the
second WAA provision. Under the second WAA provision, countries are allowed to
combine commodities in order to comply with the export subsidy reduction
requirements.167 Basically, a country could treat wheat, wheat flour and other wheat
based commodities as a single group. 168 As a result, a country which subsidized
wheat and wheat based products during the base period would be able to shift
subsidies among the wheat based products so long as the country meets the required
export reduction with regards to wheat based commodities in the aggregate. 169
Essentially, the country would create an unfair advantage.
The unfair advantage is gained because the wheat producing country could, by
combining several like commodities into one group and then shifting the export
subsidies among some but not all wheat commodities, continue to be overly
protectionist as to their most profitable and competitive wheat export while at the
same time only reducing export subsidies on their menial/uncompetitive wheat
exports. In addition, using export subsidies, like the example above, is “heavily
concentrated in a handful of countries.”170 For example, “only 25 out of 135
countries have the right under the Agreement to subsidize exports, and three
exporting countries account for 93 percent of wheat subsidies, 80 percent of beef
subsidies, and 94 percent of butter subsidies.”171 As supported throughout this
section, the second WAA provision, like the first, has failed to level the playing field
for developing and least developed countries in a meaningful way.
Finally, under the third WAA provision, WTO member nations must reduce
domestic subsidies based on an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). 172 For each
WTO member, the Base Total AMS is a “quantification” of all domestic agricultural
subsidies during the time period of 1986-1988.173 Developed countries were to
reduce their Base Total AMS by 20 percent over 6 years (1995-2000) while
developing countries were to reduce their Base Total AMS by 13.3 percent over 10
years.174 Whether or not a member nation complies is measured by the Current Total
AMS, which is the level of support actually provided in a given year. 175 An
important distinction between the Base Total AMS and the Current Total AMS is
that “[w]hile the Base Total AMS (the benchmark from which reductions are made)
166
See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144, at art. 9; see also Sturgess, supra note
148, at 147-48.
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144, at art. 1(h)(i), Annex 3.
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is a comprehensive quantification of domestic subsidies during the base period, the
Current Total AMS (the standard used to measure compliance) only includes the
subsidies deemed to be most trade-distorting (so-called “amber box” policies).”176
There are two important categories of domestic support that are excluded from
the Current Total AMS.177 First, for developed countries, “the Current Total AMS
excludes products where the amount of support is less than 5 percent of the total
annual value of production.”178 However, for developing countries, the Current Total
AMS excludes products where the amount of support is less than 10 percent of the
total annual value of production.179 Second, “the Current Total AMS excludes direct
payments under production limiting programs (“blue box” exemption).” 180 Examples
include U.S. deficiency payments and E.U. compensation payments. Both of these
payments, which go to farmers, give farmers the difference between a government
target price for agricultural commodities and the corresponding market price. 181
These “blue box” exemptions are extremely unfair to developing and least developed
countries because including U.S. deficiency payments and E.U. compensation
payments in the calculation of the Base Total AMS while failing to exclude them
from the Current Total AMS basically gives the U.S. and the E.U. credit for
domestic subsidy reductions they never made.182
Moreover, “The exclusion of “blue box” subsidies from the Current Total AMS
undermined the effectiveness of the [WAA’s] subsidy reduction obligations by
excluding precisely the types of domestic support most utilized by developed
countries, namely U.S. deficiency payments and E.U. compensation payments.” 183
For example, in the United States, during 2002, congress passed a law that was
projected to increase subsidy payments by 74 percent over 10 years.184 Lastly, under
the WAA, certain “green box” support measures, such as income support to farmers
decoupled from production, income safety-net programs, and crop insurance
programs, are not required to be reduced.185
Under the WAA, which required countries to reduce domestic subsidies in order
to level the playing field, developed countries were able to use several trade176
See Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 457; see also McNiel, supra note 144, at 57;
Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144, at art. 6:5.
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distorting domestic subsidies (through the use of several exemptions) while
developing countries were prevented from using similar practices.186 As a result, for
developing countries, the WAA has been a wolf in sheep’s clothing causing a great
deal of the distrust that has led to the Doha Round stalemate. 187
With many anti-dumping laws failing to accurately target predatory dumping188
and agricultural subsidies that create a greater rift between developed and developing
countries, resulting in the increase of trade disputes dealing with protectionist trade
measures,189 the WTO has been unable to solve these disputes because it lacks the
authority to enforce the relevant DSU decisions. 190
Despite the proliferation of international trade agreements and the
accompanying development of sophisticated structures of international
dispute resolution, if nations have no intention of being bound by the
terms of these agreements, the language of ‘free and fair trade’ is no more
than lofty rhetoric.191
C. The Single Undertaking
In the midst of a world recession, developed countries like the United States have
little incentive to provide greater market access to developing countries. Moreover,
without reciprocal concessions by emerging economies like China, Brazil and India,
developed countries become even more resistant to the idea of providing developing
countries with greater market access. Further complicating the possibility of greater
market access to developing countries is the single undertaking. To many, the single
undertaking is “a key element” to negotiations under the WTO multilateral trading
system.192 Under the single undertaking, “[v]irtually every item of the negotiation is
part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed [to] separately.” 193
Essentially, “[n]othing is agreed until everything is agreed.” 194
186
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Those in favor of the WTO multilateral trading system believe the single
undertaking gives developing countries increased bargaining power because, under
the multilateral system, all parties to an agreement have equal rights. 195 However,
due to the “diametrically opposed perceptions of the Round between developed and
developing countries,”196 the single undertaking has failed to bring WTO member
nations together. Instead, as one commentator opines, “[i]t may well be that the core
underpinning of the negotiations, the single undertaking, has become an obstructing,
rather than facilitating, factor.”197
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the stalled Doha Round, certain aspects of the WTO multilateral
trading system are problematic. With the Doha Round entering its eleventh year of
negotiations it is time for WTO member nations to ditch the status quo. In order to
make meaningful progress towards an agreement, the member nations involved in
the Doha Round negotiations should abandon the impractical single undertaking and
focus on solving the most pressing issues by reaching bilateral and regional
agreements. In 1980, several nations attempted to open a round of multilateral trade
negotiations.198 However, in 1982, much like present day, many nations were
reluctant to engage in trade liberalization due to a world recession, high
unemployment and debt problems. 199 As a result, the United States shifted its focus
to reaching bilateral and regional trade agreements in order to achieve trade
liberalization.200
Recently, the European Council announced that it would be moving towards
more bilateral and regional agreements. 201 Specifically, the European Council stated:
Whilst strengthening and widening the multilateral system and concluding
the WTO Doha Round remain crucial objectives given their expected
benefits in terms of growth and job creation, renewed emphasis should be
given to bilateral and regional agreements, particularly with strategic
partners and those whose markets are expanding at a significant pace.
Such efforts should in particular be geared to the removal of trade
barriers, better market access, [etc.]202
While the commitment by the European Council is a step in the right direction, in
order to resolve the key issues that have stalled the Doha Round, the United States
and other key members of the WTO should remove the most pressing issues from
the impractical single undertaking and attempt to solve them by using bilateral and
regional agreements. In doing so, developed countries may finally deliver on their
195
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eleven-year-old promise to lower trade barriers and create greater market access for
developing and least developed countries.

